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Murky Intentions: The Decision to Allow Subtherapeutic Use of
Antibiotics in Animal Feed
NRDC v. FDA, 760 F.3d 151 (2d Cir. 2014)
Kristina Youmaran
I. INTRODUCTION
The threat of a superbug has been heard across a variety of mediums.
The medical community tells society not to use too much hand sanitizer in
order to reduce the development of bacteria that is more resistant. In addition,
medical personnel avoid over-prescribing antibiotics to children to treat
minor illnesses that do not necessarily require medication.1 The threat of a
resistant superbug to all developed antibiotics is a real concern that many
people may not have considered. One threat that has received mixed reviews
from the general public, the food industry, and the drug industry is the use of
antibiotics in animal feed.2 If you go into a grocery store, you may find labels
that proclaim “no antibiotics.” However, this remains in the minority, as most
meat sold in stores has at least some exposure to antibiotics.3
If humans are given antibiotics for common illnesses, why is it an
issue that animals are fed antibiotics? Animals are prone to disease and
become expensive to farmers if the animals die from contracting diseases,
which, in turn, affects the consumer. Antibiotics have been used for decades
in the United States.4 Not only are they administered into animal feed to fight
illness, but they are also used to prevent disease and promote growth.5
1

Dr. Richard Raymond, What the Center for a Livable Future, Pew Commission &
Others Aren’t Telling You About Food Production 1-2.
2
Brent F. Kim et al., Industrial Food Animal Production in America: Examining the
Impact of the Pew Commission’s Priority Recommendations ix-xi (2013).
3
Id. at 2.
4
Id.
5
News Desk, Poultry ‘Feed Tickets’ Show Systematic Antibiotics Use,
http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2014/09/poultry-feed-tickets-show-systematic-
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Studies have shown that antibiotic resistant bacteria can result from
subtherapeutic use of these drugs in animal feed, which can easily spread to
humans.6 Society has already experienced the effects of at least one strain of
antibiotic-resistant bacteria, Methicillin Resistant Staphylococcus Aureus
(MRSA), which killed more Americans than HIV/AIDS or homicide.7 As the
connection between antibiotic over-usage and antibiotic-resistant bacteria
becomes more evident, it is crucial that the government, food industry, and
health professionals take tangible steps to ensure public safety.
The Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) allows the use of
antibiotics in animal feed for disease control, disease prevention, and animal
growth, but does not have a system in place to review the distribution of
antibiotics.8 The FDA can initiate withdrawal proceedings that review
subtherapeutic drugs and remove them from service if deemed unsafe.
However, as seen in NRDC v. FDA,9 despite a proceeding filed in 1977 for
the banning of certain subtherapeutic uses of drugs in animal feed, the FDA
is not currently required to hold withdrawal proceedings for those drugs.10
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
The FDA sought an appeal after the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York entered summary judgment in favor of public
interest advocacy organizations, including the Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., the Center for Science in the Public Interest, the Food Animal
Concerns Trust, Public Citizen, Inc., and the Union of Concerned Scientists,
Inc. (collectively, “Plaintiff”).11
In 2011, Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit against the FDA alleging two
claims: (1) under 21 U.S.C. § 360b(e)(1), the FDA must hold the 1977
antibiotics-use/#.VGIwaVPF800 (last visited Nov. 21, 2014).
6
Brent F. Kim et al., Industrial Food Animal Production in America: Examining the
Impact of the Pew Commission’s Priority Recommendations 2 (2013).
7
Lauren Orrico, Note, Squashing the Superbugs: A Proposed Multifaceted Approach to
Combatting Antibiotic-Resistant Bacteria, 27 J. L. & Health 259, 260-61 (2014).
8
Id.
9
760 F.3d 151 (2d Cir. 2014).
10
Lauren Orrico, Note, Squashing the Superbugs: A Proposed Multifaceted Approach to
Combatting Antibiotic-Resistant Bacteria, 27 J. L. & Health 259, 262 (2014).
11
NRDC v. FDA, 760 F.3d 151, 156 (2d Cir. 2014).
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notices of opportunities for hearing (“NOOHs”) hearings, and (2) the FDA
delayed its response to the 1999 and 2005 petitions to withdraw some of the
subtherapeutic use of antibiotics in animal feed.12 Depending on what the
hearings under the first claim revealed, the FDA would have to remove
approval for the listed drugs.13 Additionally, under the second claim,
Plaintiffs asked the Court to prompt a response from the FDA.14
The FDA denied the petitions in the second claim, thus making the
claim moot.15 They opined that granting the requests in the petition would be
too “costly and lengthy.”16 In addition, new research would have to be
performed along with an individual drug analysis.17 The plaintiff responded
by filing a supplemental complaint, which alleged that “denial of their
petitions was arbitrary and capricious.”18
The district court “granted plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment
on the NOOH claim,” and found “that 21 U.S.C. § 360b(e) required the FDA
to hold a hearing once it had made a finding that a particular drug use was not
safe.”19 The district court also “ordered [the] FDA to institute withdrawal
proceedings for the uses discussed in the 1977 NOOH and, unless the
manufacturers could rebut the finding, withdraw approval for those drug
uses.”20 Further, it ruled in favor of the plaintiff’s claim “that the denial of the
citizen petitions was arbitrary and capricious,” because the FDA’s claim
regarding the cost and length of withdrawing the proceedings was not
relevant under the provided statute.21 Even though the FDA argued that it
was trying to regulate antibiotic use in animal feed, the court found that the

12

Id.
Id.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Id. at 157.
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Id.; See NRDC v. FDA, 872 F.Supp.2d 318 (S.D.N.Y.2012).
13
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statute was clear and there were still certain mandatory measures that must be
taken.22 In its decision, the court primarily relied on Massachusetts v. EPA.23
On appeal by the FDA, the appellate court reversed the district court’s
ruling.24 The appellate court found that it was ultimately the FDA’s decision
to “institute or terminate a hearing process.”25 As such, the FDA’s decision to
deny the petitions was not “arbitrary nor capricious.”26
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Required Hearings Claim
1. History of the FDA’s Task-Force and NOOH Hearings
Dating back to 1951, the FDA approved antibiotics as an ingredient in
animal feed in order to promote animal growth, and two years later, the use
of antibiotics as a drug in the feed.27 This trend began as animal meat
producers sought to yield larger animals in a shorter time span.28 Since the
FDA had authority to regulate animal drugs under 21 U.S.C. § 360b(a)(1),
drug manufacturers asked the FDA to approve a number of different
antibiotics for animal usage.29 It was not until the 1960s that the FDA
“became concerned about the safety to man and animals of subtherapeutic
antibiotic use both as a general matter and specifically in the context of
animal feed.”30 By 1972, the FDA created a task force to investigate a claim
on animal antibiotic use made by the United Kingdom’s Joint Committee.31
The task force eventually recommended that antibiotic manufacturers provide
22

Id.
549 U.S. 497, 127 S.Ct. 1438, 167 L.Ed.2d 248 (2007).
24
NRDC, 760 F.3d at 176 (2d Cir. 2014).
25
Id. at 175.
26
Id.
27
Id. at 153.
28
Id.
29
Id.; See 21 U.S.C. § 360b(a)(1).
30
Id.; See Tetracycline (Chlortetracycline and Oxytetracycline)-Containing Premixes:
Opportunity for Hearing, 42 Fed.Reg. 56264, 56266 (Oct. 21, 1977) (“Tetracycline
NOOH”).
31
Id. at 154. (“The claim included the notion that there was a fatality of 0.26% with the
drug.”).
23
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evidence regarding drug safety in animal feed. Specifically, the investigation
revealed that:
(1) the use of antibiotics in ‘subtherapeutic amounts’ favors the
selection of antibiotic-resistant bacteria; (2) animals treated with such doses
of antibiotics can serve as hosts for resistant bacteria, which can then be
transferred to humans; (3) the prevalence of resistant bacteria had increased;
and (4) resistant bacteria had been found in meat and meat products intended
for human consumption.32
After obtaining the requested information, NOOHs were created for
two antibiotics – penicillin and tetracycline. The FDA’s Bureau of Veterinary
Medicine Director found the usage of these antibiotics unsafe. However, the
antibiotics were ultimately allowed to be used in certain amounts.33 In the
1980s and 1990s, studies of antibiotic use in animals and their effect on
humans continued, reaching various conclusions regarding the safety of the
drugs for animals and humans.34 By 1999, public interest groups began
efforts to push the FDA to withdraw any approval for the subtherapeutic use
of antibiotics in animal feed.35
2. The Statute and Regulations
The FDA regulates drugs administered into animal feed under 21
U.S.C. § 360b(a)(1).36 Section 360b(e)(1) lays out when it is appropriate to
withdraw approval of antibiotics.37 Specifically, it states that “[t]he Secretary
shall, after due notice and opportunity for hearing to the applicant, issue an
order withdrawing approval of an application filed . . . with respect to any
new animal drug if the Secretary finds.” The statute also lists six different
examples involving scientific data, untrue statements of material fact, or new
information.38 The statute allows the Secretary or the Commissioner of the
32

Id.
Id.
34
Id. at 154-55.
35
Id. at 155-56.
36
Id. at 153.
37
21 U.S.C. § 360b(e)(1).
38
Id.
33
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FDA39 to suspend any drug approval if he or she finds that it presents an
imminent danger to animals or humans.40 The statute does not clearly specify
when the finding must take place or the process leading to the findings.41 If
the statute’s meaning is disputed, courts shall explain the language of the
statute along with an analysis of what is typically found in legal practice.42
Another important regulation in this case is § 360b(d)(1).43 This
section outlines the grounds on which an application for approval of a drug
may be dismissed, which may occur only after due notice and an opportunity
for a hearing.44
Sections 5.84, 514.200(c), 10.55(b)(2)(i), and 514.155(b)(3)(ii) are
also relevant in regards to various interpretations of § 360b(d)(1).45
Ultimately, these regulations sketch out who can issue NOOHs, when these
findings are appropriate and how these decisions relate to holding hearings.46
Under 21 C.F.R. § 5.84,47 “[t]he Director and Deputy Director [of the CVM]
are authorized to issue [NOOHs] . . . and to issue notices of withdrawal of
approval when opportunity for hearing has been waived.”48 Regulation §
514.200(c) dictates that an application for a hearing must:
giv[e] the reason why the application should not be refused or
should not be withdrawn, together with a well-organized and fullfactual analysis of the clinical and other investigational data he is
prepared to prove in support of his opposition to the Commissioner's
proposal. A request for a hearing may not rest upon mere allegations
or denials, but must set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine
and substantial issue of fact that requires a hearing. When it clearly
appears from the data in the application and from the reasons and a
39

NRDC v. FDA, 760 F.3d 151, 156 n. 12 (2d Cir. 2014).
21 U.S.C. § 360b(e)(1).
41
NRDC, 760 F.3d at 158.
42
Id. at 160. (Dissenting opinion, post at 5, quoting N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross
& Blue Sheifl Plans v. Travelers Inc. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 655 (1995)).
43
21 U.S.C. § 360b(d)(1).
44
Id.
45
NRDC, 760 F.3d at163-66.
46
Id.
47
NRDC v. FDA, 760 F.3d 151, 156 n. 18 (2d Cir. 2014).
48
NRDC, 760 F.3d at 164 (quoting 21 C.F.R. § 5.84(a)(1)-(2)).
40
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factual analysis in the request for the hearing that no genuine and
substantial issue of fact precludes the refusal to approve the
application or the withdrawal of approval of the application (for
example, no adequate and well-controlled clinical investigations to
support the claims of effectiveness have been identified), the
Commissioner will enter an order on this data, stating his findings
and conclusions.49
This regulation outlines the requisites for the hearings in regards to a
NOOH and relates that findings could happen after a hearing or in absence of
a hearing.50 Lastly, § 514.155(b)(3)(ii) details that the Commissioner “‘shall
notify in writing the person holding an application approved pursuant to
section 512(c) of the act and afford an opportunity for a hearing on a proposal
to withdraw approval of such application if he finds that one of the conditions
described in § 360b is met. 21 C.F.R. § 514.115(b)(3) (emphasis added).”51
Under this rule, the Commissioner must make a finding to order a NOOH and
withdraw approval of a NADA.52
B. The Petition’s Claim
1. A Comparison to New York Public Interest Research Group v.
Whitman53
In New York Public Interest Research Group v. Whitman, an
advocacy group challenged the EPA’s insufficient enforcement of
environmental programs under § 502(i) of the Clean Air Act (“CAA”).54
Under section 502(i) of the CAA, notices or sanctions are to be provided
when “the Administrator makes a determination that a permitting authority is
not adequately administering and enforcing a program.”55 One issue in the
case was an interpretation of § 502(i), specifically when the EPA is required
49

NRDC, 760 F.3d at 164-65.
NRDC, 760 F.3d at 165.
51
Id. at 166. (quoting §514.155(b)(3)(ii)).
52
NRDC, 760 F.3d at 166.
53
321 F.3d 316 (2d Cir.2003).
54
New York Pub. Interest Research Grp. v. Whitman, 321 F.3d 316 (2d Cir. 2003).
55
Id. at 330.
50
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to hold these enforcement proceedings.56 However, the court found that the
EPA Administrator has discretion as to when an enforcement proceeding
must be initiated. Furthermore, if Congress intended for the EPA to initiate
enforcement proceedings whenever there was a deficiency in a program, then
“Congress could have fashioned a regime under which, for example, an
interested party could initiate the process leading to a determination of
whether ‘a permitting authority is adequately administering and enforcing a
program.’”57
IV. INSTANT DECISION
The NRDC begins with a review of 21 U.S.C. § 360b(e)(1) to
determine if the FDA must continue withdrawal hearings for antibiotics
previously approved for subtherapeutic purposes but later shown to not
necessarily be “safe for humans.”58 The court focuses on the language “shall
... issue an order withdrawing approval”59 and determines that this language
is one of the major areas that the parties disagree over in interpreting when an
order of withdrawal must be made.60 The court ultimately sides with the
FDA’s interpretation with respect to both grammar and standard legal
practice.61 The plaintiff’s interpretation requiring two findings goes beyond
what is called for in the statute itself because the plaintiff’s interpretation
would necessitate the Secretary to make findings before the hearings would
even begin.62 The court concedes that the statute’s grammar can make
interpretation difficult. Nonetheless, the FDA’s interpretation is correct in
allowing the Secretary to withdraw a drug’s approval following a notice and
hearing process when a drug is determined unsafe.63
Next, the court examines the broader statutory context in order to
better understand the intent of the statute.64 In this section, approval of a drug
can be withdrawn immediately “‘if the Secretary . . . finds’ that the drugs
56

Id.
NRDC, 760 F.3d at 174-75.
58
NRDC, 760 F.3d at 158.
59
21 U.S.C. § 360b(e)(1).
60
NRDC, 760 F.3d at 158.
61
Id. at 161.
62
Id.
63
Id. at 163.
64
Id.
57
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pose an ‘imminent hazard to the health of man or of the animals.’”65
However, this language supports neither party’s arguments.66 The language
in § 360b(d) also discusses when the Secretary can refuse the approval of a
new drug for animal-use, but the court found this does not occur until a
hearing has concluded.67 On this issue, the court held that “it is
unquestionably clear from the text that the mandate to order withdrawal only
applies after the agency has held a hearing.68 Indeed, it is clear from the text
that an order withdrawing approval may not be entered - except in the
emergency circumstances referred to in § 360b(e)(1) - without providing
notice and a hearing to the drug's sponsor.”69
The court then looks at the regulations brought by the parties
regarding the required hearings claim but reasons that the proffered
regulations are not taken into consideration because they do not “directly
address the question before the Court.”70 Finally, the court examines the
background legal concepts concerning administrative law and finds it likely
that Congress would “impose limits on traditional agency discretion or to
mandate actions protective of human safety” when dealing with the safety of
drugs.71
In responding to whether hearings are required, the court takes the
text of the statute, the context of the statute, regulations surrounding the use
of the statute, and the legal context that the statute was used in, and holds that
the FDA is not required to hold hearings and has broad discretion when
deciding whether or not a drug used on animals must be discontinued.72
For the second claim, regarding denial of the 1999 and 2005 petitions
as being “arbitrary or capricious,” the court turns to New York Public Interest

65

Id.; See 21 U.S.C. § 360b(e)(1) (last paragraph).
Id. at 162.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
Id. at 166.
71
Id.
72
Id.
66
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Research Group v. Whitman73 and relies on the text “‘[w]henever the
Administrator makes a determination that a permitting authority is not
adequately administering and enforcing a program ... in accordance with the
requirements of this subchapter.’”74 The court decides that using the word
“determination” allows for discretion by, in this case, the EPA
Administrator.75 The court finds this analogous to the NRDC case, in that the
FDA, like the EPA Administrator, has discretion to decide if, and when, a
hearing process will take place in response to requiring a withdrawal of
approval for animal drugs.76 The court asserts that it is reasonable for the
FDA to merely reduce the amount of antibiotics used instead of withdrawing
them completely.77 Therefore, the FDA was not acting arbitrarily or
capriciously when it denied the petitions.78
V. COMMENT
Two major results emerged from the NRDC79 decision: (1) the FDA
has discretion when deciding if withdrawal proceedings are necessary for
drugs and (2) the FDA reasonably exercised diligence when deciding whether
or not to take action on previous citizen petitions by taking some level of
action.80 Considering relevant precedent, the language of the statute leaves
room for many interpretations. When these regulations are subject to
multiple interpretations, the court will ultimately defer to the agency in
charge.81 This decision, in addition to raising awareness of the procedural
issues regarding the use and removal of certain drugs, highlights the
fundamental issues under the current system in allowing drugs to be used in
animal feed, particularly when research indicates these drugs pose public
health risks.82

73

321 F.3d 316 (2d Cir. 2003).
Id.
75
Id.
76
NRDC, 760 F.3d at 175.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
760 F.3d 151 (2d Cir. 2014).
80
Id.
81
NRDC, 760 F.3d at 175.
82
Id. at 176.
74
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The FDA’s intentions appear fair, given that their objective is to
create a forum where hearings are held to determine if a drug is no longer
safe for public use.83 However, these intentions may be misguided provided
that no hearings are held, despite citizen petitions and the instant case.84 The
reasoning behind the FDA’s decision to not pursue these hearings remains
unclear.85 As the dissent describes, “the FDA has consistently reaffirmed
that using low doses of antibiotics on healthy livestock to promote growth
could accelerate the development of antibiotic-resistant bacteria, causing ‘a
mounting public health problem of global significance.’”86 The FDA is
aware of the dangers of these drugs, even in low doses.87 Yet, no action has
been taken, and courts continue to allow the FDA to abuse its discretion on
this issue.88 By allowing the FDA to use its discretion has ensured change
will not occur, especially since inaction has reigned since the 1977
introduction of the withdrawal procedures.89 Essentially, the decision in this
case allowed the FDA to ignore a public petition deeming a drug unsafe,
which is not in line with the original intention of the regulation 21 U.S.C. §
360.90
A. The Required Hearings Claim
Under 21 U.S.C. § 360b(e)(1),
“The Secretary shall, after due notice and opportunity for
hearing to the applicant, issue an order withdrawing approval of an
application . . . with respect to any new animal drug if the Secretary
finds . . . (B) that new evidence . . . shows that such drug is not shown
83

Lauren Orrico, Note, Squashing the Superbugs: A Proposed Multifaceted Approach to
Combatting Antibiotic-Resistant Bacteria, 27 J. L. & Health 259, 277 (2014).
84
NRDC, 760 F.3d at 156.
85
Id.
86
NRDC, 760 F.3d at 176, citing FDA, Guidance for Industry # 209: The Judicious Use
of Medically Important Antimicrobial Drugs in Food–Producing Animals 4 (April 13,
2012).
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
Id.
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to be safe for use under the conditions of use upon the basis of which
the application was approved....”91
The text reveals the ambiguity within the statute and in situations
such as in the present action. It is up to the courts to look to Congress’ intent
when drafting the statute.92 In one interpretation, it would be up to the
Secretary after notice and a hearing to declare whether the drug needs to be
withdrawn.93 Alternatively, the statute could be interpreted so that the FDA is
required to withdraw approval when evidence shows the drug is no longer
safe.94 The decision at hand sided with the former, providing the FDA with
more discretion.95
However, as the dissent states, the purpose of the FDA, according to
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act,96 is to “promote the public health
by promptly and efficiently reviewing clinical research and taking
appropriate action on the marketing of regulated products in a timely
manner.”97 It is also up to the FDA to “protect the public health by ensuring
that . . . human and veterinary drugs are safe and effective.”98 This language
does not specifically present how the FDA can “promote public health” or
ensure that drugs are “safe and effective.”99 If the primary purpose of the
FDA is to promote public health and to ensure that drugs are safe and
effective, it makes sense that Congress intended that the FDA thoroughly
investigate all claims that a drug may no longer be safe for public use.100
These investigations are time-consuming and expensive; however, they align
with the main purpose of the FDA and are a necessary part of the agency’s
role in ensuring public safety.101
91

NRDC, 760 F.3d at 177, citing 21 U.S.C. § 360b(e)(1).
NRDC, 760 F.3d at 175, citing FDA, Guidance for Industry # 209: The Judicious Use
of Medically Important Antimicrobial Drugs in Food–Producing Animals 4 (April 13,
2012).
93
NRDC, 760 F.3d at 177.
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
Pub.L. No. 75–717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–
399f).
97
NRDC, 760 F.3d at 178, citing 21 U.S.C. § 393(b).
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
NRDC, 760 F.3d at 178.
101
NRDC, 760 F.3d at 180.
92
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Additionally, courts have “construed § 355(e) to require the FDA
move forward with withdrawal proceedings if it makes a preliminary finding
that a drug is not shown to be safe.”102 The dissent properly brings attention
to the fact that “[i]n dicta, the Supreme Court characterized § 355(e) in
language that almost exactly mirrors the plaintiffs' interpretation of §
360b(e)(1)(B): ‘If the FDA discovers after approval that a drug is unsafe or
ineffective, it ‘shall, after due notice and opportunity for hearing to the
applicant, withdraw approval of’ the drug.’”103 Sections 360b(e)(1)(B) and
355(e) are similar regulations, but have been interpreted differently.104 One
requires mandatory withdrawal proceedings, while the other is up to the
discretion of the FDA. Given the similarities between the statutes, if a drug is
found to be no longer safe, § 360b(e)(1)(B) should be construed in similar
fashion to § 355(e) and require withdrawal proceedings to commence.105
Without this interpretation, the FDA fails to achieve its purpose.
1. The Citizen Petition
In 1999 and 2005, the FDA ignored citizen petitions asking to initiate
withdrawal proceedings.106 Instead, the FDA simply employed a voluntary
program where drug companies could follow a compliance strategy in lieu of
partaking in the withdrawal proceedings.107 The question is whether the FDA
did so arbitrarily and capriciously.108
Comparing this case to Whitman,109 where the court ruled that the
Administrator has authority to determine the enforcement of a program,110
the FDA’s discretion in denying the citizen petitions seems to be warranted.
102

Id.
NRDC, 760 F.3d at 181.
104
NRDC, 760 F.3d at 180-81.
105
Id.
106
NRDC, 760 F.3d at 187.
107
Id.
108
NRDC, 760 F.3d at 188.
109
N.Y. Public Interest Grp. v. Whitman, 321 F.3d 316 (2d Cir.2003) (Holding that “the
EPA's finding that in the notice of final rulemaking granting interim approval, the agency
had to specify what changes the state had to make before fully approving the program.”).
Id.
110
Id. at 330.
103
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Yet, the issue in Whitman involved an agency enforcement action, whereas §
360b(e)(1)(B) does not.111 As the dissent discusses, the withdrawal
proceedings are similar to traditional enforcement actions in certain aspects,
such as how “they envision an adversarial process, in which the agency
attacks the safety of a particular drug and its sponsor defends it . . . [and] they
implicate the agency's ability to manage its resources and set administrative
priorities.”112 However, this case and the processes that the withdrawal
proceedings follow are more analogous to the rule-making process.113 The
proceedings resemble a notice-and-comment format because they allow
petitions to be heard and responded to accordingly.114 Furthermore, they also
generally apply to standard contact by applying to drug sponsors and
marketers.115
Whether withdrawal proceedings succumb to the rulemaking process
or enforcement actions is a close debate. Nevertheless, Congress likely did
not intend to give the FDA “unlimited discretion to leave unsafe drugs on the
market for extended periods of time,” which would be the case under an
enforcement action interpretation.116 Indeed, it appears more plausible that
Congress intended to allow for judicial review of the FDA’s administrative
actions.117 Without allowing for judicial review, the FDA would have
unlimited power to avoid withdrawal proceedings and potentially unsafe
drugs would remain in use.118
According to the majority opinion, the FDA can continue to ignore
citizen petitions because the agency believes that “the indiscriminate and
extensive use of [medically important antibiotics] in animal feed is
threatening, it does not necessarily believe that the administration of
antibiotics to animals in their feed is inherently dangerous to human
health.”119 However, the majority and the FDA agree that antibiotic

111

NRDC, 760 F.3d at 188.
NRDC, 760 F.3d at 188-89.
113
Id.
114
Id.
115
Id.
116
NRDC, 760 F.3d at 190.
117
Id.
118
Id.
119
NRDC, 760 F.3d at 192.
112
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resistance is a public health concern and there is a connection between the
over-administration of drugs and the development of antibiotic resistance.120
Regardless, inaction remains. Subtherapeutic administration of the
drugs may not immediately endanger the public, but a combination of these
smaller acts will lead to an increasing threat.121 The purpose of the citizen
petitions is to bring the issues of antibiotic use before the FDA. Instead of
taking the claims seriously and investigating them, the FDA has continually
ignored them. This is particularly concerning given that “[i]f indeed the FDA
regards such indiscriminate uses as threatening — or more precisely, as ‘not
shown to be safe,’ 21 U.S.C. § 360b(e)(1)(B) — then it should withdraw the
relevant approvals. At the very least, it should be required to squarely
address the scientific issue of whether those uses have been shown to be safe,
which is the sole issue that the statute makes relevant.”122 Simply ignoring
the issue does not align with Congress’ intent.
2. Moving forward
The NRDC123 court sought a ruling on two drugs – penicillin and
tetracyclines – when, in reality, there are hundreds of antibiotics being used
subtherapeutically in animals.124 There remains substantial room for progress
in ensuring that antibiotic drug use in animal feed is not a serious public
health concern. If the FDA does not take action, the threat of developing
antibiotic resistant bacteria is of imminent concern.
A potential step forward is to have Congress enact a less ambiguous
statute addressing when withdrawal proceedings need to be held and under
what conditions.125 Creating timetables and specific procedures to create
actionable steps forcing the FDA to, at a minimum, investigate claims, would

120

Id.
Id.
122
Id.
123
760 F.3d 151 (2d Cir. 2014).
124
Brent F. Kim et al., Industrial Food Animal Production in America: Examining the
Impact of the Pew Commission’s Priority Recommendations 2 (2013).
125
Lauren Orrico, Note, Squashing the Superbugs: A Proposed Multifaceted Approach to
Combatting Antibiotic-Resistant Bacteria, 27 J. L. & Health 259, 289 (2014).
121
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ensure that the claims are researched and scrutinized appropriately.126 The
FDA should be able to use its discretion, but not at the expense of the welfare
of the public, which contradicts its purpose and public policy.127
VI. CONCLUSION
Antibiotic resistance is a growing issue. Although there are systems
in place that are theoretically used to remove drugs that are not safe,
Congress needs to enact clear legislation so that if challenged in court, there
are effective means for drugs to be removed from the market. Not only is
more well-defined statutory language necessary, but cooperation from the
FDA will also be required to ensure that the safest practices are being
adhered to in the food industry.128 Change comes at a cost though. In this
case, the cost may be absorbed by the general public. However, given that
public health is threatened with the use of these subtherapeutic drugs, this is a
necessary and justifiable cost. NRDC v. FDA129 was not decided in support of
efforts to prevent antibiotic-resistant bacteria through the subtherapeutic use
in animal feed. However, by highlighting the inadequacies in the current
language of current legislation it is an important development to more
productive efforts.
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